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Abstract Personhood is ascribed on others, such that
someone who is recognized to be a person is bestowed
with certain civil rights and the right to decision making.
A rising question is how severely brain-injured patients
who regain consciousness can also regain their person-
hood. The case of patients with locked-in syndrome
(LIS) is illustrative in this matter. Upon restoration of
consciousness, patients with LIS find themselves in a
state of profound demolition of their bodily functions.
From the third-person perspective, it can be expected
that LIS patients might experience a differential person-
al identity and may lose their status as persons. Howev-
er, from the patients’ perspective, it is uncontested that
they retain their personal identity and that they consider
themselves to be persons.We here include results from a
survey with patients with LIS aimed at identifying the
primary expectations of patients for their care by non-
medical professionals. Based on these first-hand reports,
we argue that personhood in LIS is progressively
regained as the widening circle of others recognizes
them as persons.
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Background
The Locked-in Syndrome
The locked-in syndrome (LIS) is a clinically rare ac-
quired condition characterized by severe motor disabil-
ity with preserved non-verbal capacity to communicate
[1]. LIS is usually caused by lesions at the pons of the
brainstem and it is primarily of vascular etiology, al-
though it is also observed at the end-stage of amyotro-
phic lateral sclerosis (ALS), a motor-neuron disease [2].
Based on patients’ motor abilities, LIS can be
subdivided into (1) classic, which describes tetraplegic
and aphonic patients using coded communication by
vertical eye movement or blinking, (2) incomplete,
wherein patients have remnants of more voluntary
movements other than oculomotor ones, and (3) total,
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immobility, including eye movements [3]. LIS patients
with pure brainstem lesions have preserved cognitive
functions, as assessed by standard neuropsychological
testing [4], and report a good quality of life even in total
LIS, using brain-machine interfaced communication [5].
For healthy individuals, such severe restrictions of in-
dependent and physical function may appear as a fright-
ening scenario which leads to questions of whether a
Blife is worth living^ after severe brain injury [6]. This is
mainly due to an estimated lower quality of life which is
tightly linked to perceptions about severe disability [7].
By and large in disability, quality-of-life instruments
assess health and wellbeing in terms of physical func-
tioning, mental, and emotional dimensions of experi-
ence [8]. Therefore, if quality of life is based on the
perceived value of physical and mental functioning, it is
possible that healthy individuals can underestimate the
quality of life that patients with chronic disabilities lead.
Studies show that indeed when partners or caregivers
rate patients’ quality of life, the questionnaire scores are
significantly lower than when patients do it for them-
selves [9–12]. The puzzling effect of patients’ high self-
ratings on quality of life measures in the presence of
disability is known as the Bdisability paradox^ [13], and
it can be partially explained by the way people adopt
different perspectives on perceived quality-of-life.
Physical functioning is, therefore, considered critical
for oneself. From the theoretical point of embodiment,
sensorimotor skills shape cognition, selfhood and sub-
jectivity [14]. According to the theory, an organism is
considered a self when: a) it possesses volume in space
(localized within bodily boundaries), b) it recognizes a
global body representation (the body is perceived as a
whole as opposed to localized body parts and isolated
movements), and c) it possesses a visuospatial frame of
reference/egocentric model of reality. These properties
are respectively referred to as self-location, self-
identification and a first-person perspective [15]. In the
extreme case when all three aspects of selfhood are
disturbed, as can happen in cases of neurologic patients,
illusory global own body perceptions come about, such
as out-of-body experiences (i.e., patients seeing their
own body in extracorporeal space, while they localize
and identify themselves with this new representation
[16]). It has been suggested that the experience of being
the author of our own actions and being able to selec-
tively control our body actions (agency) also enables
selfhood [17]. In that case, physical function is impli-
cated because the subjective sense of agency depends on
successful prediction of sensory consequences of action
[18]. Based on this framework, imprecise sensory pre-
dictions can lead to mental disorders, where patients
need to rely strongly on external cues in order to predict
their environment [19]. For example, in the case of
schizophrenia patients experiencing their actions as hav-
ing external rather than internal causes. Interestingly,
though, agency is not a constitutive condition for the
phenomenal aspects of selfhood. This follows from
clinical observations of impaired motor control like the
alien hand syndrome [20] and like, in our case, the LIS.
In the former case, patients experience their limb
performing seemingly purposeful acts without their in-
tention, often interfering with the actions of their normal
limb. In the latter case, patients are fully paralyzed even
to the point of eye movements, while they remain fully
conscious in their impaired bodies. In both cases, the
subjective experience of a unified self remains. There-
fore, although the paralyzed body remains a strong
component of patients’ experienced personal identity,
patients adjust to objective changes by perceiving them
as meaningful, while caregivers fail in predicting these
patients’ experiences [21].
Third-Person Perspectives on LIS
It is usually easy to evaluate a third person’s situation by
directly asking him or her what it is like being in a
particular condition. In the case of patients with severe
disabilities such evaluation may be hindered as a result
of inefficient communication, physical constraints or
due to the inability to get in contact with these patients
in the first place. Therefore, qualitative estimations can
be inferred by observing behavioral output or by em-
pathic mechanisms – as if one is in Bsomeone else’s
shoes^. A recently conducted survey among physicians,
clinicians and other non-medical professionals, illumi-
nated third-person attitudes towards medical and ethical
issues surrounding the LIS [22]. In terms of pain per-
ception, it was found that a vast majority (90%) consid-
ered that patients in LIS feel pain, which is in accor-
dance with what patients generally self-report [e.g., 8].
Interestingly, 9% of respondents negated pain percep-
tion in patients in LIS which corroborates the frequent
misunderstandings around the syndrome [23]. Indeed,
public information can be fraught with misconceptions
even for more widely known conditions, such as the
vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome
(VS/UWS) [24]. The VS/UWS is a clinical condition
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of unconsciousness wherein patients are awake but
show only reflexive movements denoting no perception
of themselves and their environment [25]. In the case of
the complete LIS, therefore, it can be that a conscious
but paralyzed patient can be mistaken for an uncon-
scious one, if signs of consciousness (other than com-
munication) are not detected. When LIS was compared
to VS/UWS, the same survey showed that the majority
of participants considered it to be worse than being
unresponsive. A possible explanation could be that since
LIS patients are aware of their condition, in contrast to
unresponsive patients who do not reach this level of self-
awareness, the situation may be judged as worse as a
function of retained consciousness. In that sense, greater
sentience could mean a greater ability to feel both pain
and suffering from being in a severely compromised
state [26].
It terms of end-of-life options in LIS, it has been
found that the majority (75%) of respondents
were opposed to stopping treatment, i.e., artificial nutri-
tion and hydration and invasive ventilation [22]. To
disagree with treatment withdrawal in LIS seems rea-
sonable, if one considers that patients retain cognitive
and emotional function [4]. These results corroborate
what patients report for themselves, that although sui-
cidal thoughts can be present in the initial stages of the
syndrome, with the passage of time they generally
report a satisfactory wellbeing [9, 22]. Interestingly,
one quarter of the surveyed participants considered that
treatment can be stopped in patients with chronic LIS.
Surprising as it may seem to endorse the possibility for
conscious patients to hasten death, the presence of con-
sciousness alone might not always work in favor of
patients’ best interests because it jeopardizes
the patients’ autonomy, dignity, and suffering [27]. Au-
tonomy especially seems of great value to one’s
wellbeing. As stated by the Belmont report [28] indi-
viduals should be treated as autonomous agents, and
persons with diminished autonomy in particular are
entitled to protection. In the same line, the American
Academy of Neurology [29] recognizes that adult
patients with severe and permanent paralysis have
the right to make decisions regarding their own
healthcare and to accept or to refuse life-sustaining
therapy.
The aforementioned survey further identified a dis-
sociation between third-person and first-person perspec-
tives in attitudes. Specifically, it was found that a great
proportion (56%) of respondents would decide
differently about end-of-life if they were in LIS them-
selves by refuting staying alive if they imagined them-
selves in this condition [22]. This is consistent with
previous studies where physicians decide differently if
they are in a professional role deciding for others than if
they are in an existential role deciding for themselves.
Such results suggest that clinical decision-making can
be fundamentally different when one decides for oneself
or gives advice to others. One explanation could be that
the preference not to undergo life-prolonging treatment
stems from the fear of a profound identity change due to
modified body image. In other words, when healthy
individuals would imagine their bodies severely para-
lyzed, they would report a discontinuity in their personal
identity after the imagined acute loss of motor control
[21]. However, patients’ bodies continue to live after
their accidents, implying that identity in patients in LIS
is primarily socially constituted [30]. As such, the loss
of independent function, control, and mobility, which
eventually may lead to social isolation, could also have
been the reasons that the respondents refused more
frequently to be kept alive if they imagined themselves
in a chronic LIS.
Taken together, these data suggest that respect for
persons partly relies on the fact that respected entities
have a moral status or moral agency, but also that they
have worth and value for others. This relational (or
contextual) understanding of respect for persons, there-
fore, entails that the urge for respecting the person is not
based on the person’s capacities, but instead on the
obligation towards others, respect for human relation-
ship, and respect for what a person was before the injury
[31]. Therefore, an interpersonal approach to LIS may
shed more light on the issue of personhood in severe
motor disability.
First-Person Perspectives: Personhood
as an Interpersonal Status
Previous studies have shown a noteworthy difference
between the actual experience of LIS patients in the
first-person perspective and the experience that care-
givers and third parties predicted LIS patients would
have [21, 22]. Because of this discrepancy, it is impor-
tant to explore the experience of personhood from the
patients’ standpoints. A recent study, presented during
the 2016 SOFMER congress by Seguin, adopted this
focus and found that the two major contributors to
patients’ feelings who were treated as a person were
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quality of communication and quality of human envi-
ronment [32]. For instance, addressing the patient di-
rectly, rather than talking about the patient to their
present caregiver, contributed to (re)establishing the
patients’ personhoods. These findings are consistent
with a notion of personhood as interpersonal status
[33]. In this sense, individuals achieve the status of
person when and only when others recognize them as
persons. This concept of personhood, thus, focuses on a
socio-phenomenological experience, constituted
through interpersonal attitudes. In the case of LIS pa-
tients, the attitudes of others towards them can contrib-
ute to establishing or demoting personhood.
Here, we report qualitative findings from a sur-
vey initiated by a patient with LIS who contacted
other LIS patients. With these results our purpose
was to emphasize our assumption about the inter-
personal dimension of personhood rather than ex-
haustively quantifying this issue. The survey’s ini-
tial aim was to identify the expectations of patients
for their care by non-medical professionals
(homecare assistants). While the survey did not
explicitly target interpersonal factors, the analysis
here centered on interpersonal attitudes that contrib-
ute to reinforcing personhood, namely the willing-
ness to listen and communicate, the consideration
of LIS patients as able-minded persons, and the
respect of their rights and abilities to make deci-
sions for themselves. The study was originally pre-
sented during the 2016 annual ALIS workshop
(Boulogne Billancourt, March 25) and later pub-
lished in the association’s magazine (La Lettre
d’ALIS, 28, October 2016). The study was ap-
proved by the ethics committee of the University
of Liège. Completion of the questionnaire was vol-
untary, anonymous, and was considered to
be consent for participation in the survey.
Methods
Participants
Originally, 36 patients were contacted and 30 pa-
tients responded (83% response rate), either elec-
tronically or in person between January and
March 2015. The sample comprises 13 females and
17 males, mean age = 49y ± 9 (range = 35–66), with
LIS mean duration = 13y ± 8 (range = 3–32); 29
patients had suffered a pontine stroke and 1 patient
infectious disease; 18 respondents were in a classical
LIS, 11 were in an incomplete LIS, and 1 did not
respond as to the type of LIS.
Four demographic questions (gender, age, duration
of LIS, and housing) and nine open-ended questions
were addressed:
– Who helps you for everyday actions?
– Howmany helpers do you have and over howmany
hours (day/night)?
– What are 3 things you expect from the person
helping you?
– What are the skills required to help you (gestures
and technical know-how)?
– What feels unacceptable?
– Would you like to share a relevant anecdote on this
point?
– Is there a specific point you would like to stress
about that?
– Imagine the ideal helper: how is she/he?
– According to you, what is creating problems and
what could solve them?
Data Analysis
We conducted qualitative descriptive analysis of
the responses to the open-question section of the
survey. Responses were analyzed in three phases.
The first two authors coded the data qualitatively,
by assigning each statement a label capturing its
general theme. For instance, the answer Bdid not
try to learn the communication code^ was coded
as Black of communication^. Likewise, the re-
sponse Bpretended not to hear or understand^ was
coded as Bavoid communication^. Coders were
blind to each other’s coding. In a second phase,
the coding categories were consolidated across
coders, and a final code was attributed to each
answer. For instance, the two previous statements
were both categorized as Black of communication^.
Last, we analyzed the three most prevalent catego-
ries, relevant in the context of our discussion of
personhood: lack of communication, objectification,
and lack of consideration (Fig. 1). These three cat-
egories encompass several concrete ways in which
pe rsonhood can be promoted or demoted
interpersonally.
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Results
Lack of Communication
Of the 30 respondents, 29 (96.7%) reported that the
(un)willingness to communicate was the primary factor
shaping their experience of personhood in their interac-
tions with homecare assistants. Respondents system-
atically reported feeling that they were not treated
as persons when others Bpretended not to hear or
understand^, Bdid not try to learn the communica-
tion code^, Bdid not listen or respond^, Bignored
or interrupted the person^.
On the other hand, making the effort of understand-
ing the patient by learning the communication code,
asking the patient for their input and waiting for the
answer, demonstrating friendliness and patience in lis-
tening to the patient and taking their comments into
account in everyday care were perceived and highlight-
ed as appropriate behavior by 23 respondents (76.7%).
This data suggests that adopting the proper attitude in
communicating with LIS patients is core to their sense
of personhood.
Objectification
A large majority of respondents (n = 23; 76.7%) de-
scribed interactions that left them feeling Bnot respected
as persons^ but rather Btreated as objects^. Descriptions
of such situations included care providers engaging in
long phone calls or text conversations with others during
their shift rather than engaging with the patient, speak-
ing of the patient in front of them, or caring for the
patient with headphones on to listen to music;
Bpretending they haven’t heard [what I said]^, Bignoring
me^, Bpretending they understood^, Btreating me like a
piece of furniture^, Bmaking decisions for me^, or
looking at patients Bas curiosities rather than human
beings^. Several respondents highlighted their yearning
for Bhuman contact and communication above and be-
yond technical tasks of assistance^, describing that
helpers sometime Bgo too fast^, treating their time with
the patient as a succession of technical gestures rather
than a relationwith another person, which was described
as Btreating us like cattle^. The lack of certain attitudes
also contributed to feeling objectified, such as talking to
the patient, sharing games, humor, discussions, being
friendly.
Lack of Consideration
Finally, the third most prevalent category encompassed
behaviors denoting a lack of consideration, and 19 re-
spondents (63.4%) underscored their impact on experi-
enced personhood. These behaviors covered a range of
situations. For instance, a respondent described: BSome
people associate ideas such as: he cannot speak so he
cannot hear and when they talk to you, they can’t help
shouting^. Another such situation was described as fol-
lows: BThere are some who speak pidgin French, and
others who make you believe they have a lot of esteem
for you, asking questions and not waiting for the
answers.^ Several respondents reported that lack of con-
sideration could manifest as Btreating me like a
vegetable^, Btaking me for simple minded^, Btalking to
us like babies^, Binfantilizing me^, Btreating me like I am
stupid^, or as if the patient was senile, calling the patient
BOld-timer or Grandpa^, and invariably contributed to
Fig. 1 Interpersonal attitudes
impact experienced personhood
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weakening their experienced personhood. A respondent
erupted: BI’m not 15 years old!^ and another echoed:
BMy head works just fine!!!^
Discussion
With these results, we aimed at illustrating the role of inter-
personal attitudes in promoting or demoting personhood in
LIS patients. Indeed, respondents listed social skills as the
most important aspect of a caregiver’s interaction with
them, even when answering questions about know-how
and technical gestures.
Establishing Personhood through Communication
Communicating with someone in LIS is a challenge of
both expression and comprehension. Individuals may use
different codes, which must be learned by any new
homecare assistant to allow communication. These codes
often rely on lengthy processes, such as reciting the alpha-
bet for the patient to spell words by selecting one letter at a
time through blinking. Furthermore, re-establishing com-
munication at an early stage is often delayed by multiple
factors: absence of deliberate movements (60%), a poten-
tial deliberate movement which was not used (16%) and
patients’ impressions that could achieve a movement
which has not yet been seen (4%). The yes-no code which
is used most frequently by families (85%) is used less
frequently by therapists and nursing staff. Since this type
of communication is necessary for proper care, neglecting
it therefore has repercussions on the LIS person’s experi-
ence and future history.
Yet communication is crucial to personhood because
it allows for a sense of agency. Even more so for LIS
patients, who have lost the ability to act upon and
manifest their will through a physical action, communi-
cation becomes the only channel to agency. It is not
surprising then that respondents often connected the
unwillingness of their homecare assistant to learn their
communication code to an experienced loss of agency:
not communicating with the LIS patient soon would
turn into Banswering or deciding for me^, Bacting on
me without asking^, Bnot asking for my opinion^,
or Bnot respecting my choices and habits^.
Restoring communication through the use of im-
proved communication protocols is therefore likely to
result in reinforcing the sense of personhood of LIS
patients. In line with this importance of communication
to maintain the experience of personhood through inter-
personal attitudes, a LIS person reported: BWhen I use
my eye-controlled computer, the handicap is forgotten
for a while; the machine becomes a space of freedom
where I can do what I want, when I decide to… even
though a computer will never replace the spontaneity of
a conversation^. Another LIS person said: BSo, is there
some tip to feel better? I think it’s all very personal but,
my recipe would be for sure: it’s better to have a good
homecare assistant and an efficient communication
computer, then the method is up to you!^
Establishing Personhood through Interpersonal
Attitudes
Beyond communication, attitudes from others can grant
or demote personhood. Patients highlighted the negative
effects of a lack of consideration in their relationship
with care providers. From the results, it seems that the
root of these behaviors lies in a misunderstanding of
what LIS is. A respondent explains that Bsome people
rely on my physical appearance and make remarks,
thinking I don’t’ understand them^. Others may think
that a LIS person is not cognitively competent: BI am
handicapped, says a LIS respondent, but I am of sound
mind^, paralleling the response of another participant
BWe’re not brain handicapped^. Specific education of
homecare assistants may help alleviate the effects of this
misconception, and in turn remedy the behaviors that
are perceived as lack of consideration for the patient.
Like the unwillingness to communicate, the errone-
ous assumption that the LIS person does not understand
human interactions leads to an array of objectifying
behaviors that diminish the patients’ sense of person-
hood. If it is assumed that the LIS patient does not
understand their environment, it becomes possible to
act around and upon them as we would do around
objects. Namely, homecare assistants with this implicit
bias were reported by respondents to pick up their
phones and have private conversations while on duty
at the patient’s home, to disregard the patient’s desires
and family rules/habits, and to become lax with the
respect of patients’ privacy. They would make decisions
without consulting the patient and act as if the patient
was not there. Respondents reported that such attitudes
would make them feel Blike a piece of furniture^ or Blike
cattle^. A respondent expressed as their main concern
the need for the homecare assistant to Btreat me as a
person and not an object^.
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Objectification, indeed, is the direct negation of per-
sonhood, or in Mounier’s words: BThe person is not an
object. It is actually that, which in each man cannot be
treated as an object^ [34]. Indeed, when personhood is
compromised in interpersonal attitudes, the LIS person
may come to feel as the exact opposite of a person, and
come to feel as an object.
Limitations
Due to the methodology of this project, a few limitations
must be acknowledged. First, the data was collected by
an inexperienced researcher. The questions as well as
the motivation for the survey, came from several con-
versations among LIS patients about their subjective
experience with home caregivers. The patient with LIS
who initiated the survey was involved in the training of
home caregivers, and wanted to raise awareness about
the subjective experience of LIS patients in these inter-
personal contexts. This organic, rather than theory-in-
formed, process offers both strengths and weaknesses.
To the first, it is rooted directly into the subjective
experience of patients, thus reflecting the most salient
aspects of their experience in a way that may elude a
purely theory-driven approach insofar as the disability
paradox highlights divergence between the first- and
third-person perspectives. To the latter, this data merely
illustrates the importance of these topics and our de-
scriptive analysis aims at providing a proof of concept
and encouragement to investigate how these behaviors
interact with perceived personhood in the LIS. A second
limitation is the small sample size, which is frequent in
such populations. However, the very high response rate
suggests that this topic was particularly engaging for the
respondents. The high response rate is even more mean-
ingful in response to open questions, which increase the
communication burden for LIS patients, compared to
multiple choice questionnaires or Likert scales. Finally,
a third limitation comes from the descriptive and explor-
atory nature of this analysis. We do not propose infer-
ential statistics or a predictive model here, but rather
describe qualitatively factors relevant to personhood
experienced from the first-person perspective.
Implications
Although preliminary, these findings may contribute to
improving the care of LIS patients in three ways. First,
this is a type of data which is understudied and bears
important information. The first-person, qualitative na-
ture of the data anchors our reflexion at a level of
analysis which is directly relevant to the patients. Given
the frequent discrepancy between the first- and the third-
person perspectives, it is important that the field take
into account subjective reports from the patients to
inform our theoretical models of personhood in LIS.
As scientists, investigating direct, subjective reports of
perceived personhood, in addition to objective measures
of personhood assessed by a proxy (like legal consider-
ations), may precisely be what it means to treat LIS
patients as persons. Second, these results provide con-
crete recommendations for caregivers to turn away from
attitudes that tend to damage experienced personhood in
LIS patients. Specifically, caregivers should watch for
the following behaviors in their interactions with LIS
patients: not answering the patient or making decisions
for the patient, acting without asking the patient first or
not waiting for the patient’s answer, and not respecting
the patient’s answer when expressed. Additionally, care-
givers should be mindful of their implicit bias, such as
assuming that the patient is mentally ill, incapacitated,
senile, or immature because of the visible, physical
impairment. Third, this data has implications for the
way we evaluate the quality of caregiving services.
Currently, the criteria used to assess the quality of ser-
vices do not systematically include direct consideration
of the behaviors and implicit attitudes that impact the
experienced personhood of LIS patients. Future studies
could propose a new assessment tool and investigate
how current quality assessment methods compare to the
new one, thus contributing to improving the standard of
service quality assessment for the care of LIS patients.
Conclusions
Personhood is ascribed on others, such that interperson-
al attitudes from third parties can reinforce or demote its
sense. For LIS, third-person perspectives can encom-
pass erroneous implicit beliefs, such as thinking that LIS
patients are cognitively incompetent or unwilling to
communicate. This often leads to an array of specific
behaviors that may result in LIS patients losing their
statuses of person when interacting with others. From
the patients’ perspective, when third parties are willing
to learn their communication codes and show a genuine
interest in learning the patients’ own thoughts and de-
sires, it greatly contributes to reinforcing the patients’
Attitudes towards Personhood in the Locked-in Syndrome: from Third- to First- Person Perspective and to...
experience of personhood. Based on first-hand reports
from LIS patients, we think that personhood of LIS
patients is progressively regained as a widening circle
of others recognize the patient as a person.
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